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DOES GOVERNMENT REGULATION WORK? 
by ERIC L. STATTIN, Nat iona l Service D i rec to r for Savings and Loan, Los Angeles 
Regulation of business by government is not new. The 
Emperor Hammurabi established a central government in 
Babylon around 2000 BC and promulgated a code of over 
300 laws. Some dealt with business activity and seemed to 
be aimed at assuring integrity in business dealings. 
Some 15 centuries later, Aristotle wrote the fol lowing: 
"He who purposes duly to manage any branch of economy 
should be well acquainted with the locality in which he 
undertakes to labor and should be naturally clever, and by 
choice industrious and just; for if any one of these qualities 
be wanting, he wil l make many mistakes in the business 
which he intends to take in hand." 
Aristotle was talking about management of business, not 
its regulation by government. Today, however, much busi-
ness decision-making and policy-setting are preempted by 
specific government regulation or by a regulatory agency. 
Are the qualities Aristotle required in a business manager 
present in today's regulatory bureaucracy? 
One way or another, most of American business is 
regulated by federal, state, and local government. Some 
industries are more closely regulated than others: the 
railroads, truckers, and public utilities, for example. They 
have territories, rates, quality of service, and even 
accounting systems prescribed for them. Financial insti-
tutions are also closely regulated by federal and state 
authorities, and it is the effectiveness of that regulation 
which is to be questioned here. Does government 
regulation of financial institutions work? 
There is plenty of evidence that government regulation 
of financial institutions does not work. There is even more 
public opinion to that effect. A skeptic might even suggest 
that in those circumstances where regulation does seem to 
work, other factors are really responsible. 
The present regulatory system was shaped by conditions 
which were generally negative and which the public and 
the institutions themselves wanted to avoid repeating. Of 
all the calamities, the Great Depression was probably the 
most profound. 
Notwithstanding this negative genesis, most regulators of 
financial institutions see their role as one of making positive 
contributions to our society and our economy. Naturally, 
there are obvious conflicting interests. Businessmen, 
homeowners, and trustees of deposit insurance funds 
would measure success differently. How regulators deal 
with these interests is one way of gauging their success. 
The Regulatory Tightrope 
The Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 and the National 
Housing Act of 1934 were drawn to provide emergency 
relief to homeowners then suffering from the Depression 
and to encourage future thrift and home ownership. The 
federal savings and loan system, Federal Home Loan Bank 
System, and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion (FSLIC) were created to help meet these objectives. 
Federal insurance of bank deposits came into being also. 
Perhaps the greatest conflict among regulators of 
financial institutions is that which exists between the 
providers of capital and the users of capital. Other conflicts 
exist wi thin the classes of capital providers and within the 
classes of capital users. Lately there have also arisen con-
flicts between regulatory agencies. For example, the SEC 
and federal bank regulators disagree over how full " f u l l " 
disclosure should be for publicly owned banks. The SEC 
wants bank stockholders to be fully informed, while bank 
regulators are fearful that bad news might cause the 
depositors to lose confidence and bolt. 
How do the regulators deal wi th conflicts and decide 
which policy wi l l best serve the "publ ic interest"? The 
savings and loan industry represents a simple example of 
providers (mainly individual savers) who had put up $286 
bil l ion at year end 1975. How does the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board balance thrift, economical home ownership, 
and the interests of the FSLIC? 
A federally chartered savings and loan organization is 
required to make most of its home loans to people of 
modest means. Regulations also prescribe the maximum 
loan to value ratios and require that most loans be made on 
properties within a prescribed distance of their off ice. Such 
limitations are intended to reduce the investment risk, and 
thus protect the savers' interests and the FSLIC. 
But what happens when people of less than modest 
means expect or are perceived by politicians as deserving to 
become homeowners? Many of these families cannot come 
up with a 20 percent down payment on even a $30,000 
home. When that home inflates in value 10 percent or more 
annually, the prospective homeowner is further behind. 
The government's response has been to subsidize both 
the risk and the direct cost of housing. The problem is that a 
few of these arrangements are in the form of hidden 
subsidies that offer a potential for regulatory abuse. For 
example, the FHLBB is under no legal or self-imposed 
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requirement when it decides what net worth must be main-
tained to protect savers and the FSLIC. (Perhaps even 
weaker statutes exist for the banking industry.) Nor is the 
General Accounting Office, to the writer's knowledge, 
required to examine the propriety of the FHLBB's net worth 
requirements or the FHLBB's administration of its rules. 
Thus, there is an accountability gap, and capital providers 
can unknowingly lose their net worth protection. 
The "redl ining" issue, so much in the news lately, is 
another example of a conflict between providers and users 
of capital. O n the one side, inner city borrowers complain 
that lenders (mostly S&Ls since they finance the majority of 
single-family homes) refuse to lend in their neighbor-
hoods. A red line is drawn, in effect, on a map delineating 
the area in which loans are not made. Usually these areas 
are racially changing, which raises the specter of dis-
crimination, too. 
However, regulatory agencies are not at all certain that 
lending money in areas which appear inevitably headed for 
urban decline is in the interests of the lending institutions, 
its savers, or the FSLIC. Ironically, independent studies of 
urban decline show that disappearance of financing is one 
of the last factors in the process. In other words, with-
holding mortgage credit because of perceived urban 
decline is not a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
It is hard to fault the intent of legislators and regulators 
when it comes to opposition to redlining. It is highly doubt-
ful, though, that their response—requiring the disclosure 
of lending patterns—will open up a flow of housing credit 
to the inner city. Prior attempts at credit allocation in the 
form of government-supported housing projects clearly 
have not worked well. 
The Regulation Q Debate 
Regulation Q presents another clear conflict between the 
providers and users of capital in the S&L and banking 
industries. Regulation Q , which controls interest rates that 
may be paid by banks and S&Ls, was first adopted to prevent 
banks from waging interest rate wars. 
When savings and loan associations were brought under 
a rate control statute in 1966, it was for somewhat the same 
reasons as for banks 30 odd years earlier, except there was 
no general depression. There was concern, instead, that too 
much money was being taken out of the East and invested 
in the West Coast S&Ls. These S&Ls, mainly in California, 
were thought to have fully exploited the market for sound 
loans and there was concern that a further rapid savings 
growth would lead to serious loan portfolio problems. 
The regulatory authority clearly is acting in the interest of 
savers when it acts to curtail unsound growth. But it is not 
entirely clear that instituting rate control on consumer 
savings has had that effect. Many S&Ls in California and 
Nevada were de facto failures, anyway, as a result of growth 
which took place prior to 1966. Some of these failures were 
not dealt with decisively until the 1970s; and to top it off, 
rate control on S&Ls was legislated in the first year of "dis-
intermediation," precisely when many S&Ls could have 
benefitted from freedom to compete on a price basis. Inter-
estingly, some of the political pressure to subject S&Ls to 
rate control came from the banking industry, which was 
becoming conscious of the consumer savings market. 
Now, 10 years later, Regulation Q is the law of the land. 
O n passbook savings, banks cannot pay over five percent, 
while S&Ls can pay 5Vi percent. Similar differentials exist for 
longer term accounts. 
A chocking account was considered a privilege 
reserved for those who had money, and an account 
in our bank implied a certain standing. A new 
account was not opened unless the prospective 
depositor had a proper introduction. . . . A bank 
check was not (hen the common medium of 
exchange that it is now, and a depositor who 
insisted on drawing a great number of checks for 
small amounts would be reprimanded by the 
c a s h l e r • —AN "OLD TIME BANKER" 
Is the saver's ox being gored by Regulation Q? That 
depends on whether one deals with a large or small saver, 
with a sophisticated or unsophisticated saver. The small 
saver has no choice. He cannot beat Regulation Q by going 
into Treasury bills at 7.5 percent or better because the price 
of admission is too high. So the little guy is stuck with 5 
percent at a bank or 5VA percent at an S&L. 
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But what about savers in federally insured financial insti-
tutions as a group? Are they being allowed to earn a fair 
return? Aside f rom the stated objective of protecting S&Ls 
as providers of housing finance, it is really diff icult to ration-
alize a lower return for savers in banks compared to savers 
in S&Ls. Who are the beneficiaries of this price-setting? 
Specifically, the beneficiaries are homeowners who were 
either clever or fortunate enough to borrow on a fixed rate 
prior to 1973. These users of capital enjoy interest rates of 
about 6 to 8 percent and are being subsidized, in effect, by 
borrowers at 9 to 10 percent and/or savers as a group. 
The regulatory response to this inflation-induced 
dilemma has not been particularly effective, or perhaps 
even appropriate. Variable rate mortgages have been 
proposed by the FHLBB but shot down by Congress. Mor t -
gage repayment terms have been stretched to the limit, 
arguably even to the disadvantage of the borrower, who 
has traded a 30-year loan for a 40-year loan, with weekly 
reductions in loan payments equivalent to a six-pack of 
beer. At the same t ime, the FHLBB has looked the other way 
as profitability of S&Ls continued to be on the low side, with 
an accompanying slippage in net worth ratios. 
The Insurers' Dilemma 
FDIC and FSLIC insure deposits of up to $40,000. At year-
end 1975, banks had total domestic deposits of almost $900 
bi l l ion, and S&Ls had total deposits of $286 bi l l ion. FDIC had 
reserves for losses of about $6 bil l ion and FSLIC had 
reserves for losses of about $4 bi l l ion. Both agencies have 
statutory lines of credit with the US Treasury. (It is of interest 
that all these assets have been borrowed by the US govern-
ment and used for purposes not easily determinable.) 
Both agencies have been put to some fairly tough tests 
and survived. FSLIC has made payoffs to savers that 
exceeded $100 mil l ion after one failure. It has also used its 
default prevention powers for institutions ranging in size 
up to $1 bi l l ion. Whi le FDIC has not suffered payoff experi-
ences of the magnitude of FSLIC, it has faced the collapse of 
banks ranging up to $5 bil l ion in assets. 
Given the deposit insurers' large exposure and relatively 
small resources, is there a proper balance of concern on the 
part of the regulators between the need for risk taking and 
the need to keep FDIC and FSLIC losses at tolerable levels? 
Or is there a bias built into the system which tends to deny 
financial institutions the "r ight to fail"? This issue is dif-
ferent between the banking industry and the S&L industry, 
because on the S&L side, the principal regulator of behavior 
is also the overseer of the FSLIC. FDIC, on the other hand, is 
not the principal regulator for many insured banks and 
must take its cue from other federal or state agencies. The 
result is some degree of corporate schizophrenia. Are 
FSLIC and FDIC to be pure insurance functions, or are they 
to also perform other roles, such as muscling financial insti-
tutions into behaving in certain ways wi thout regard to the 
insurance risk involved? 
There is no legislation—/ care not what it is—tariff, 
railroad, corporation, or of a general political 
character, that at all equals in importance the 
putting of our banking and currency systems on the 
sound basis proposed in the National Money 
Commission [Aldrich] plan. 
—WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, 1911 
The business of federal regulation is replete with 
examples of massive overki l l , mostly in the name of 
consumer protection. Blame for this certainly does not lie 
exclusively with the regulatory agencies, but a major share 
does belong to the federal regulators. When Congress per-
ceives mistreatment of consumers, it confers more power 
and responsibility on the regulators. An example: 
Regulation Z (by no means the last) is a Congressional 
enactment which is intended to protect borrowers from 
being misled on the real cost of credit. The popular title of 
this legislation is "Truth in Lending." From that, one might 
conclude that there was a significant public harm done by 
lenders who lied or misrepresented or did not fully or 
properly disclose what credit actually cost. No doubt there 
have been incidents of consumer abuse. But it is probably 
also true that those who are hurt by excessively costly credit 
or unfair credit arrangements wil l not benefit by knowing 
the " t rue annual percentage rate" on a loan. (I am thinking 
of the victim who gives back $20 to the loan shark on Friday 
for the $10 he borrowed on Monday.) 
There is an ironic twist in all this government protection 
of the consumer. Before Congress intervened, the over-
whelming majority of Americans had for many years bene-
fitted from the finest, low-cost consumer credit system in 
the wor ld . Hopeful ly, this wi l l continue in spite of 
Congress' well-meaning but misguided efforts. 
Not too incidentally, the regulatory bureaucracies were 
relatively silent in testifying to the true need for Regulation 
Z. That is consistent with the nature of the bureaucratic 
process, which is generally no t t o t u rn down an opportunity 
for growth. 
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The regulators are being told by Congress to train their 
elephant guns on different gnats almost every day. The 
Equal Credit Opportuni ty Act, the Fair Housing Act, the 
Bank Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the 
Bank Holding Company Act, the Savings and Loan Holding 
Company Act, the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act, 
and a series of "Emergency Housing" acts are all on the 
books. Other legislative proposals have been trial bal-
looned, such as the Financial Institutions Act of 1975 and 
the 1976 fol low-on Financial Reform Act. The latter even 
went so far as to propose a reform of sorts for the financial 
regulatory agencies. 
The Prognosis for Regulation 
It is probably going to get worse, worse being defined as 
more. Unfortunately, government regulations tend to 
multiply like bacteria in a nutrient-rich culture. The 
regulated industries in the case of regulators are the culture 
and, up to now, have been able to support a sustained 
growth of the regulators. As a result, however, financial 
institutions' profitabil i ty, especially for the thrifts, has not 
been adequate on balance since 1962. (Not that declining 
profitability is likely to deter growth. One recalls C. Nor th-
cote Parkinson observing the growth of the British 
Admiralty during a period when commissioned capital 
ships decreased by almost 68 percent; meanwhile, the 
Admiralty grew in number of officials by over 78 percent.) 
As a nation, we are rushing pell-mell into regulation by 
government of practically all our activities. At the same 
t ime, there is a growing feeling that our government is less 
and less representative of the people. The confluence of in-
ordinate control by a nonrepresentative government 
should be a fr ightening prospect. Yet most people seem to 
believe that business needs to be more highly regulated. 
Even businessmen seem to embrace the status quo. Suggest 
a lessening of regulation—like putt ing Regulation Q on a 
51/2-year phaseout—and most of the S&L industry and even 
some banks become very concerned. 
Regulatory reform is a diff icult, political issue. Given the 
entrenched special interests of the regulatory agencies' 
staffs and the transient, short-time political appointee 
status of agency chairmen and board members, it is 
probably impossible to reform the system short of a major 
Congressional effort. Meanwhi le specific modifications 
should be considered in the financial institutions area: 
1. The regulatory powers of the agencies should be more 
stringently defined. Regulators should not be able to 
manage business conduct through financial institutions. 
2. Prior to adopting consumerist legislation, there should 
be demonstrated significant abuse and an absence of 
existing law to deal with the problem, plus provision for an 
independent monitor ing system to prove the efficiency of 
any legislative/regulatory solution. Congress should also 
require a cost/benefit analysis before any new regulatory 
empowerment. 
3. Combine bank and S&L regulation, central bank 
systems, and deposit insurance systems in three agencies, 
one for each of the three basic functions. 
4. If the combination cannot be effected, the regulatory 
system for the two industries should be organized on a 
parallel basis. This would be patterned after the bank 
regulatory system but with the insurance, central banking, 
and regulatory functions clearly separated. 
5. The process for selecting political appointees to 
regulatory agencies should better reflect public interest. 
6. Full disclosure of all information necessary to prudent 
decision-making should be the rule. 
7. Premium rates for deposit insurance should partially 
reflect the underwrit ing risks involved. 
Resistance to change is a common human trait. So it is 
wi th organizations. But there is danger in this response. For 
if the regulatory functions of government do not respond 
to changing needs and conditions, the pressure wil l mount 
for abrupt and radical change, perhaps even chaotic 
change. One need not look too far back in t ime to observe 
chaotic change. Compare these points of view: 
"The statesman, who should attempt to direct private 
people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, 
would not only load himself wi th a most unnecessary 
attention, but assume an authority which could safely be 
trusted not only to no single person, but to no council or 
senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so 
dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and 
presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise i t . " 
"We should by one way or the other arrive at the bureau-
cratization of the economic activities of the nat ion." 
Whose points of view were they? Adam Smith and Benito 
Mussolini, in that order. G 
There is not in this country and there has never 
been in any country of the civilized world a 
government issue or banknote issue comparable in 
security to the Federal reserve notes provided by 
the bill which you are now asked to enact into law. 
—CARTER GLASS, 1913 
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